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FOREWORD: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CALLS TO REVIVE CIVIL SOCIETY
LINDA C. MCCLAIN* AND JAMES

E. FLEMING**

I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium addresses legal and constitutional implications
of the calls to revive or renew civil society (a realm between the
individual and the state, including the family and religious, civic, and
other voluntary associations). Calls to revive or renew civil society
are prominent in political and legal discourse. The erosion or
disappearance of civil society is a common diagnosis of what underlies
civic and moral decline in America, and its renewal features
prominently as a cure for such decline. Broadly speaking, there are
two strands of civil society advocates, which a leader in the civil
society movement recently characterized as the civic revivalists and
the moral revivalists.1 The first strand is illustrated by the recent
report of the National Commission on Civic Renewal, A Nation of
Spectators:How Civic Disengagement Weakens America and What We
Can Do About It, 2 and the second by the recent report of the Council
on Civil Society, A Call to Civil Society: Why Democracy Needs Moral
Truths.3 The former emphasizes "civic renewal" and reinvigorating
civic character and engagement in shared civic purposes, while the
latter stresses moral renewal, moral character, and consensus about
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics, Harvard
University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics,
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000.
1. See Don Eberly, Civic Renewal or Moral Renewal, J. AM. CITIZENSHIP POL'Y REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 44.
2. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIc RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How Cmc
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1998) [hereinafter

A NATION OF SPECTATORS].
Copies of this report are available through the National
Commission on Civic Renewal, 3111 Van Munching Hall, University of Maryland, College Park,
Md. 20742; (301) 405-2790 (phone); (301) 314-9346 (fax); http://www.puaf.umd.edu/
civicrenewal.
3. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS

MORAL TRUTHS (1998) [hereinafter A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY]. Copies of this report are
available through the Institute for American Values, 1841 Broadway, Suite 211, New York,
N.Y. 10023; (212) 246-3942 (phone); (212) 541-6665 (fax); iav@worldnet.att.net (email).
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moral truths.
To date, there has been a great deal of discussion of civil society
and proposals for its revival or renewal, but not enough discussion of
legal and constitutional implications of such proposals.
This
symposium seeks to help fill this void.4 The articles pursue questions
such as the following. What role do law and the Constitution play in
the constitution of civil society? Does the Constitution secure the
basic liberties and impose the basic responsibilities that are
preconditions for the development of a vital civil society? Or have
the Constitution's commitments and omissions undermined the
vitality of civil society? What, in our constitutional order, is the role
played by civil society? Does civil society serve as "seedbeds of
virtue" - "our foundational source of competence, character, and
citizenship"' -and foster self-government? Or is civil society's more
vital purpose to serve as a buffer or check against the state? Should
government attempt to secure congruence between democratic values
and the structure and values of voluntary associations, or would such
an effort offend commitments to pluralism and diversity? If it is not
possible to establish a clear link between participation in associations,
as such, and the inculcation of democratic values, are there some
institutions of civil society that are especially valuable for cultivating
civic virtue and fostering democratic deliberation?
The family features, in the calls for reviving civil society, as first
and foremost among the seedbeds of virtue. Is the family a seedbed
of virtue or a school of inequality and injustice? What forms of
regulation of the family are necessary and appropriate? Does the
vitality of the family as a seedbed of virtue depend upon one
particular form of family (i.e., the heterosexual, two-parent, marital
family) and should government seek to encourage that family form
and discourage others? How does the market factor into calls to
revive civil society? If business, labor, and economic institutions are
within civil society, are they seedbeds of virtue that foster civic health
or do current economic practices hinder civic health, and put
pressures on families, endangering their strength? More generally,
how do proponents of renewing civil society view the relationship
between systemic inequality (including racism) and civic health?
Have civil rights movements and gains in equality and liberty
4. Two other symposia have also addressed questions concerning law and civil society.
See Symposium: Law and Civil Society,72 IND. LJ. 335 (1997); Symposium, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1 (1998).
5. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 7.
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contributed to the decline of civil society and civic virtue? Finally,
would a revitalized civil society support democratic self-government
or supplant it?
The recent reports calling for a revival or renewal of civil society
offer numerous prescriptions, many of which implicate legal reforms
and constitutional issues. Here we give a few examples pertaining to
the family, separation of church and state, and federalism. Both civic
and moral revivalists focus upon family "breakdown" as a leading
cause of civic and moral decline and prescribe shoring up the twoparent, marital family as the necessary starting point for any strategy
aimed at recovery. 6 Among their prescriptions are reform of the tax
laws to provide incentives and benefits for two-parent, marital
families and disincentives for divorce and nonmarital child-bearing.7
They also endorse covenant marriage and reform of no-fault divorce
laws as ways of strengthening marital stability. Another prominent
theme is that religious institutions should play a central role in
America's moral and civic renewal. Both A Call to Civil Society and
A Nation of Spectators advocate that Congress should expand the
"charitable choice" provision in the 1996 welfare reform legislation which allows religious institutions to accept governmental funds for
provision of services to welfare recipients: while retaining their
"religious integrity" - to all federal laws currently authorizing the
government at any level to contract with nongovernmental
organizations to provide services. 8 Moral revivalists also call for the
government to expand the ability of parents to choose their children's
schools, which might include vouchers for religious schools. 9 Finally,
many revivalists advocate localism: for example, moral revivalists
support legal reform to limit federal judicial oversight over structures
and functions of local government such as housing, education, and
crime control, and in general both moral and civic revivalists advocate
that the federal government not hinder state and local
experimentalism. 10
6. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 18; see also A NATION OF
SPECTATORS, supra note 2, at 13.

7. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 19-20.
8. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 21; A NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note
2, at 17.
9. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 23. By contrast, A Nation of Spectators
states that "public support for parental choice broadened to include private and religious
schools" is "an important area of ongoing disagreement" among its signatories. A NATION OF
SPECTATORS, supra note 2, at 16.
10. See A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 10, 23; see also A NATION OF
SPECTATORS, supra note 2, at 11 (but insisting that "reinvigorated localities cannot substitute
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In Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, we raise some
questions for proponents of reviving civil society as a cure for many of
our nation's political, civic, and moral ills (whom we designate as
"civil society-revivalists"). The questions include some of those
mentioned above. How does civil society serve as "seedbeds of
virtue" and foster self-government? Have liberal conceptions of the
person corroded civil society and undermined self-government?
Does the revivalists' focus on the family focus on the right problems?
Have gains in equality and liberty caused the decline of civil society?
Should we revive civil society or "a civil society?"
Would a
revitalized civil society support democratic self-government or
supplant it? In the article, we largely agree with the revivalists that it
would be a good thing to revive civil society, but we raise doubts
about whether its revival can reasonably be expected to accomplish
what its proponents hope for it, e.g., moral renewal, civic renewal,
and strengthening the bonds of citizenship. We suggest that civil
society is at least as important for securing what we call "deliberative
autonomy" -enabling people to decide how to live their own lives as for promoting "deliberative democracy" -preparing them for
participation in democratic life. Working within the tradition of
political liberalism, and guided by key feminist and civic republican
commitments, we also sketch our own views concerning the proper
roles and regulation of civil society in our morally pluralistic
constitutional democracy.
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the PrescriptiveState,12
Amitai Etzioni makes a plea for conceptual clarity about two distinct
"crises" faced by American society, a civil crisis and a moral crisis: he
contends that, although they are lumped together in the discourse
about civil society, they warrant separate attention. Sympathetic with
the diagnoses of both the civic and the moral revivalists, he
nonetheless argues, for both sociological and intellectual reasons, that
it is best to keep separate the quest for a good society, which is the
goal of the moral revivalists, and the quest for a civil society, which is
for effective national institutions").
11. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questionsfor Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 301 (2000).
12. Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the PrescriptiveState, 75 CI.KENT L. REv. 355 (2000).
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the goal of the civic revivalists. The quest for a civil society seeks to
address the challenges posed by the deterioration of civil society (as
reflected in, for example, declines in voter turnout, interest in public
affairs, and participation in voluntary associations). The quest for the
good society seeks to address the challenges posed by the
deterioration of society's moral fiber (as reflected in and fueled by,
for example, teen pregnancy, nonmarital births, and the rise in "vile
and violent" elements of the mass culture).13 Etzioni elaborates three
concepts-civil society, good society, and the prescriptive state-to
distinguish among three different models of society. He contends
that there are some sharp tensions between the civil society and the
good society models with respect to social philosophy, the role of law,
and the role of associations, and that packing too much into the quest
to revive civil society hinders sound analysis.
Mark Tushnet begins his essay, The Constitution of Civil
Society,14 with a paradox: calls to revitalize civil society view civil
society as a check on the government, yet the institutions of civil
society are themselves constituted by the government. How, then,
can civil society's institutions constrain and be a source of appropriate
influence on the government, when the government defines the
boundaries of such institutions and provides support for them?
Surveying contemporary American constitutional law concerning
some of civil society's institutions -families, religious institutions,
civic associations, and political parties-he concludes that, although
the law in theory might support such institutions, constitutional law in
practice does little to ensure their vitality. This reality limits the
extent to which the institutions of civil society can serve as
counterpublics.
Tushnet criticizes as erroneous this failure of
constitutional doctrine to protect civil society and concludes that it is
a lack of will and leadership - rather than institutional obstacles - that
bar us from developing a democratic citizenry capable of supporting a
powerful yet constrained government.
Stephen Macedo's essay, Constituting Civil Society: School
Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public
Values,'- analyzes civil society in the context of his call for a civic
liberalism. Such liberalism accords a proper role for government in
shaping the character of its citizens through the noncoercive
13. Id. at 355.
14. Mark Tushnet, The Constitutionof Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 379 (2000).
15. Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit
Organizations,and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000).
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promotion of civic virtue. Acknowledging that the sphere of free
association is first and foremost a sphere of freedom, he nonetheless
contends that, from a public point of view, we cannot ignore that it is
also a sphere in which moral education takes place. His perspective
on the calls to revive civil society is that the best argument for
strengthening and putting more reliance on civil society is that, in so
doing, a liberal society can pursue public purposes more effectively.
He does not here propose to have the state attempt to coerce liberal
virtues. Instead, using the example of school vouchers, he proposes
that when the state provides money to the institutions of civil society
such as religious schools, it may regulate those institutions by
attaching conditions and in doing so moderate excesses and even
subtly and gently inculcate liberal democratic virtues. It bears noting
that for some time conservatives have proposed such an approachthat recipients of governmental benefits must "take the bitter with the
sweet." Now, Macedo proposes that liberals give them a bit of their
own medicine.
16 Michael
In his response, The New Establishmentarianism,
McConnell objects to Macedo's approach, which he calls a subtle and
He defines
gentle form of liberal establishmentarianism.
"establishmentarianism" as the idea that a nation should be animated
by a set of common values and beliefs, backed by governmental
authority. He contends that liberalism, at least in the form of the
political liberalism attributed to John Rawls, breaks with
establishmentarianism in positing that citizens of a political
community need not share common values regarding the nature of
the good life and that there are many reasonable, but mutually
inconsistent, worldviews that are compatible with good citizenship.
In this form of liberalism, it is private associations that are the
primary place for the development and inculcation of ideas of the
good life and of virtue. Macedo departs from this liberal approach to
civil society, McConnell charges, and attempts to use state power to
establish a liberal orthodoxy that enforces conformity in the name of
advancing pluralism and diversity. Illustrating with some recent case
law concerning religious individuals and institutions and certain
voluntary associations, he argues that the new establishmentarianism
17
is really "intolerance masquerading as nondiscrimination.'

16. Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism,75 CH.-KENT L. REV. 453
(2000).
17. Id. at 465.
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McConnell, an advocate of reviving civil society, expresses concerns
that when the modern insistence upon common values and diversity
within groups collides with freedom of association, it threatens to
undermine the genuine diversity and pluralism of the society as a
whole. If this happens, and the institutions of civil society are molded
in the image of the liberal democratic state, those institutions will lose
their distinctiveness, and will cease to serve as buffers against the
state.
In Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power,18 Abner
Greene suggests that we should understand the revivalists as arguing
for a plural form of human flourishing, one that encompasses
participation in the institutions of civil society as well as action
through governmental or individual forms. He argues that the central
defining norm of American constitutionalism is multiple repositories
of power-a norm that animates a constant struggle for authority,
power, and privilege-and that this arrangement refuses to privilege
any locus of power, public or private. This framework allows for
multiple types of collective action to challenge governing norms,
including forms of action arising in civil society. He questions
Tushnet's formulation of a paradox and argues that the institutions of
civil society can provide a source of power to challenge and offset the
government even if they are not strictly independent of the
government.
He criticizes Macedo's attempt to achieve some
congruence between the liberal democratic virtues of the state and
the virtues of the institutions of civil society. He contends that,
although McClain and Fleming argue that civil society may be of as
much importance for deliberative autonomy as for deliberative
democracy, their view would judge the institutions of civil society by
how successfully they replicate the virtues of a democratic public
realm.
Judging civil society by this test, and imposing such
requirements as public reason and the moral duty of civility upon its
institutions, Greene fears, might blunt their power as buffers between
individuals and the state. Yet, at least where the education of
children is involved, he cautions against a "parentalist" approach to
strengthening the institutions of civil society against the state, and
suggests that, for children to reap the benefit of multiple repositories
of power, both schools and parents should play a role in shaping and
educating children.
18. Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 477 (2000).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:289

In her well-received book, Membership and Morals,19 Nancy
Rosenblum argued that, despite common assumptions that the
institutions of civil society contribute to democracy by inculcating or
at least supporting democratic virtues, the effects of associational life
are more indeterminate and complex. In her contribution to the
symposium, Primus Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil Society,20
Rosenblum takes up the challenge to identify the associations that
stand out as qualitatively most valuable for democratic public life and
political virtues. She argues that the voluminous literature on civil
society ignores one of the most important institutions of civil society:
political parties. She contends that political parties deserve a central
place in the discussions of civil society because they are unique and
irreplaceable voluntary associations. The defining characteristics of
political parties lend themselves to deliberation about the common
good. As such, they should be valued and strengthened. She argues
that political parties have a unique, Janus-faced legal status among
voluntary associations: for some purposes they are highly regulated,
for other purposes they are deemed constitutionally protected
associations. Yet even this two-fold treatment of parties fails to
capture why parties should be considered first among equals in civil
society. Rosenblum attempts to make the case for parties' unique
contributions to democratic life in her article, concluding by
advancing certain reforms that would better allow parties to make
such contributions.
In her article, The Family in Civil Society,21 Martha Albertson
Fineman takes up an institution that is at the core of civil societyrevivalists' diagnoses of civic and moral decline and their
prescriptions for renewal: the family. Addressing the treatment of the
family in the two reports, A Call to Civil Society and A Nation of
Spectators, as well as in the work of William A. Galston, who played a
role in both reports, she argues that the revivalists' emphasis upon the
decline of the two-parent family, and their insistence upon that family
form, operates to eclipse concern with social and economic forces that
are truly destructive of families regardless of their form. She also
criticizes the reliance by revivalists upon public opinion polls showing
19. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF
PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998).

20. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares:Political Parties and Civil Society, 75 CHI.KENT L. REv. 493 (2000).
21. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 531
(2000).
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concern for family "breakdown" because it is not clear what
definitions of "family" respondents have in mind when replying to
polls inquiring about the family. Fineman attempts to move beyond
the moral and empirical debates over family forms to highlight the
lack of attention in the civil society debates to the pressures placed on
the institution of the family (however defined) by significant trends or
changes in the nonfamily institutions of civil society, particularly
those in the business or market sector. She suggests that revivalists
should focus more closely upon the irresponsibility of the state in not
regulating or mediating the excesses of market activities. Fineman
points out that, although revivalists rely on suasion and exhortation
with respect to problems they attribute to other institutions of civil
society (such as business, labor, and economic institutions), when it
comes to families, their concentration on family form leads them to
recommend a system of coercive laws and regulation over the
formation and dissolution of marriage. She focuses specifically on the
costs to families and, hence, to civil society of increased income
disparity, wage stagnation for middle and lower income wage earners,
and persistent impoverishment for many children in the United
States. Fineman concludes by urging civil society-revivalists to think
more about the family as a "public" institution that serves a vital
function of meeting the burdens of "inevitable dependency" and
engaging in society-preserving care, as well as about how to
redistribute responsibility so that the market and the state share some
of the costs inherent in meeting such burdens and providing such
care.
In The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society,2 Dorothy
Roberts also charges that the program of the civil society-revivalists,
as reflected in A Call to Civil Society and A Nation of Spectators, gives
insufficient attention to persistent economic and social disparities and
the impact of such inequality on families. This leads to a troubling
moral exclusivity in a two-fold sense. First, she argues that,
notwithstanding the superficial appeal of proposals to revive civil
society, and some concessions in the reports about the problem of
widening inequality, revivalists' analysis of moral decline promotes a
narrow meaning of morality that excludes social justice from its heart
and even suggests that moral decline or personal degeneracy explains
economic and social injustice, rather than focusing on how systemic
22. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 555 (2000).
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inequality weakens civil society. Second, this leads, she contends, to a
reform agenda that privileges those who benefit most from societal
inequality and penalizes those who are most injured by it. Here,
Roberts offers specific examples from revivalists' calls for various
reforms of family law, pointing out how such proposals would
especially burden black families.
Roberts also finds "moral
exclusivity" evident in the reports' exclusion of a serious recognition
of past and present racism and its devastating impact on any effort to
forge a common civic purpose among all Americans. Racism in
America, she contends, has an ongoing legacy requiring attention and
structural change. On her view, this inattentiveness to history also
seems to lead revivalists to link gains in social equality with losses in
civic virtue, and to devalue the tools, such as protest and social
movements, that disempowered people have used successfully to
achieve greater inclusion in the social, economic, and political life of
the nation. She concludes that it is only by recognizing social
inequalities as our chief moral problem, and as a critical threat to the
institutions of civil society, that civil society-revivalists can make good
on their "commitment to freedom and justice for all." 23

III. RESPONSES
We are fortunate to have among our contributors Jean Bethke
Elshtain and William A. Galston, two of the most prominent voices in
the civil society movement. Elshtain is the Chair of the Council on
Civil Society, which issued the report A Call to Civil Society. Galston
is the Executive Director of the National Commission on Civic
Renewal, which issued the report, A Nation of Spectators. In these
pages, they respond to some of the articles and arguments in the
symposium.
In her response, Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please
Stand Up?,24 Elshtain begins by insisting upon the importance of a
moral dimension to civil society advocacy. She calls into question the
portrait of "civil society-revivalists" painted in some of the articles as
nostalgic, inattentive to violence and abuse within marriage, and
insufficiently concerned about growing inequality and systemic
injustice. She states that she does not recognize these so-called
"revivalists." Elshtain then takes up specific criticisms in essays by
23. Id. at 555.
24. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CmH.KENT L. REv. 583 (2000).
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McClain and Fleming, Fineman, and Roberts, laying out how A Call
to Civil Society addresses such criticisms as the civil societyrevivalists' seeming ambivalence toward rights and the liberal virtues
of toleration, and their alleged insufficient attention to issues of
inequality and racism. She suggests that while civil society-revivalists
(such as herself) may be skeptical about turning to the federal
government and to big "movement" politics for solutions to social
problems, they do affirm the importance of efforts by local
communities, including community organizing, to address such
problems.
Furthermore, she attacks Fineman's critique of the
revivalists' treatment of the family, in particular, the critique of the
revivalists' readiness to turn to coercive legal regulation to shore up a
certain family form and their focus on family form rather than
function. Elshtain suggests that moving from no-fault divorce laws to
tougher divorce laws is moving from one scheme of regulation to
another, not from deregulation to regulation. As to family form, she
takes exception to Fineman's discussion of skepticism among
feminists and social scientists concerning claims for the superiority of
the two-parent family over the single-parent family. She contends
that A Call to Civil Society does pay heed to the issue of how
inequality affects families, although not as much as she herself would
have liked. But to Fineman's call for public support for the
caretaking work of families, which she evidently interprets as a call to
subsidize women's choices, Elshtain strongly objects that this is an
undesirable approach because of the harmful impact upon children in
single-parent families.
In Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy,1 Galston
responds to questions posed to civil society-revivalists and to
criticisms of some of their positions on the basis of his own views. He
rejects certain positions, such as any notion that civil society is selfsustaining in the absence of the state. At the same time, responding
to Tushnet, he suggests that it is an exaggeration to suggest that civil
society is a creation of government or that government "constitutes"
civil society. He argues, as against Fineman, that the vocabularies of
economic and culture are complementary and yet she seems to take
the view that the economy is the realm of the real and that the culture
is epiphenomenal. He sets forth his views on the role of rights and on
the various functions of civil society, along with his view that it is
25. William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 603 (2000).
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correct not to insist upon "congruence" between civil society and
democratic virtues and beliefs. Nonetheless, he insists upon the need
for some account of liberal democratic virtues suitable for a culturally
and morally diverse society. Responding to Fineman's analysis of the
family, he differs with her assessment of the social science evidence
on family forms but argues that if we move away from empirical
debate to take up the challenge of the "moral balancing involved in
setting family policy" 26 (e.g., the sometimes conflicting interests of
parents, children, women, and men), this has implications for optimal
family law and policy. This leads him to reject Fineman's proposed
shift in family policy from the state subsidizing the male-female dyad
to subsidizing the mother-child dyad. He agrees with Fineman's call
to look at economic issues affecting families, but concludes that this
fortifies the case for the two-parent family, given its generally higher
level of well-being than that of the single-parent family. Responding
both to McClain and Fleming's and to Roberts' critique of his moral
accounting, which appears to juxtapose gains in equality and liberty
against losses in civic virtue, he restates his basic argument that
fundamental changes have occurred in our public culture over the
past four decades, some of them positive, others negative. Finally, he
closes by appealing to public sentiment and judgment, including
ambivalence about the moral condition of American society, and
suggests that it is incumbent upon democratic social theorists to give
such views respectful consideration, as proponents of renewing civil
society attempt to do.

26. Id. at 607.

